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DEALING WITH DIVERSITY: CHANGING
THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION
DEBORAH A. CALLOWAY*
This talk is based on an article that I am working on concerning
the changing concept of equality and discrimination in employ-
ment discrimination law. I appreciate this opportunity to share
my preliminary thoughts on this subject with you today.
The concept of equality as a desirable social goal dates back, at
least, to the Greek city-states.' The Athenian concept of equality,
however, was limited2 and in those limitations it is possible to
identify issues regarding equality that remain unresolved to this
day.3
Citizens of Athens "enjoy[ed] equality-before the law, in dis-
cussion of public affairs and in access to public office."4 But citi-
zenship in Athens was limited to men who met certain qualifica-
tions. Excluded were "all women, [as well as] farmers, laborers,
mechanics, freedmen, slaves and aliens."5 These groups were de-
nied participation in public affairs on the basis of their status or
citizenship.
* Deborah Calloway is currently on the faculty of the University of Connecticut School of
Law where she teaches Legal Regulation of the Employment Relationship and Employ-
ment Discrimination Law. Previously, she clerked for Judge Spottswood Robinson on the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and was an attorney at the law firm of
Wald, Harkrader and Ross in Washington, D.C., where she specialized in labor and em-
ployment issues. She has co-authored two books on employment law: Cases and Materials
on Employment Law (1993) and Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination Law
(1994). In addition, she has published a number of articles dealing with employment dis-
crimination law. She received her undergraduate degree in Psychology, cum laude, Phi
Beta Kappa, from Middlebury College and she received her Law Degree, cum laude, from
Georgetown University Law Center where she served on the Board of the Georgetown Law
Journal.
1 See RAPHAEL SEALEY, THE ATHENIAN REPUBLIC 5-31 (1987) (discussing varying levels of
equality among citizens and non-citizens of Athens).
2 See id.
3 See generally J. PETER EUBEN ET AL., ATHENIAN PoLrrICAL THOUGHT AND THE RECON-
STRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 61-66 (1994) (addressing similarity of inequality be-
tween Athenian times and present day).
4 PHELPS BROWN, EGALITARIANISM AND THE GENERATION OF INEQUALITY 16-19 (1988).
5 See id. at 289-90. "All these men may well have been equal and free in many respects,
but the majority of the population, including women, children, metics, and slaves, most
certainly was not." Id.
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The mass exclusion of classes of individuals from equal enjoy-
ment of the full benefits and responsibilities of citizenship was
deemed consistent with a concept of equality, because equal treat-
ment meant that persons were entitled to what they deserved.
Those who merited equal treatment were entitled to have it, 6 but
inequality also was thought to be just and right for those who
were unequal.7 The excluded groups were justly excluded because
they were inferior, innately,8 or by education or occupation. For
example, women and slaves were considered naturally to be infer-
ior and therefore appropriately subject to being ruled.9
The Athenian concepts of equality and inequality raise ques-
tions that continue to plague nations seeking to meet the needs of
diverse populations. 10 Should perceived or real group differences
justify different treatment based on group membership? What
does equality mean-equal treatment, equal opportunity, equal
results or all three? Should equality extend to economic as well as
political rights?
In the United States, for much of this century, attention has
focused primarily on the first issue-combatting discrimination
based on membership in a group. The Declaration of Indepen-
6 See id. at 293-97 (discussing rights of Athenian citizens).
7 ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS III, ix 1280 a7 (1981 ed.) "[IIndiscriminate equality for all
amount[s] to inequality... ." Id.; PLATO, THE LAws VI 757 (1988 ed.).
8 See AImsToE's POLITICS supra note 7, at 1.1260a9-14.
The free rules over the servile in one way, the male over the female in another, and the
man over the child in yet another. All the partners possess the elements of the human
mind, but they possess them in different ways. The slave does not have the faculty of
deliberation at all. The female has it but in an indefinite form. The child has it but in
an imperfect form.
Id.
9 See RICHARD GARNER, LAw & SOCIETY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 84 (1987).
A woman, like a piece of property, was always under legal control of some man; and if
he should die in her lifetime, she and whatever was attached to her passed to the next
male relative in the same elaborate order of succession used for any other property.
Id.
10 ARIsTOTLE's POLITICS, supra note 7, I, v, 1254 bs, b16. The Greek philosophers also
debated whether the right to equality includes economic as well as political equality. Aris-
totle thought not: "[wihile there is certainly some advantage in equality of possessions for
the citizens as a safeguard against faction, its efficacy is not really very great. In the first
place discontent will arise among the more accomplished people, who will think they de-
serve something better than equality . . . ."Id. at II, vii, 1267 a37; VI, v 1320 a17; II, vii,
1266 b24. See generally EUBEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 252-264 (applying Athenian ideology
to society with diverse populace). The author asks the question:
[Hiow can America-a polyglot society with one of the most varied and ambiguous
mixture of peoples, races, and religions in human history, a county of some 250 million
people-learn to be more democratic from Athens-a country of at most 50,000 citi-
zens at its population peak?
Id. at 253.
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dence stated that "all men are created equal."1 However, like the
Athenians, the men who drafted the United States Constitution
did not see the concept of equality as inconsistent with limiting
rights on the basis of group membership. The Constitution itself
recognized limits on equal access to the most basic human right,
liberty, by depriving Congress of the power to prohibit the impor-
tation of slaves until 180812 and by prohibiting states from freeing
runaway slaves.13 Similarly, women were not entitled to the most
basic political right, the right to vote, until the ratification of the
19th Amendment in 1920.14
It was not until the Civil Rights Movement breathed new life
into the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 15
that distinctions based solely on race and gender began to be per-
ceived as unacceptable. The American consensus that intentional
and mindless discrimination is morally outrageous has its roots in
the Civil Rights Movement. The southern system of segregation
fell of its own weight. No unsubstantiated concept of racial inferi-
ority was capable of justifyring the extreme inequities imposed by
southerners on African Americans-widespread lynching 16 as
well as separate and inferior facilities, including bathrooms,
schools, lunch counters, water fountains, jobs, public accommoda-
tions, seats on buses, and housing. 7
11 See Tim DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). "We hold these Truths to
be self-evident, that all Men are created equal." Id.
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. Article One, section 9 states that "[the Migration or
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit,
shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and
eight." Id.
13 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Article Four,
section 2 provided that "[no] Person held to Service or Labor in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
discharged from such Service or Labor, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to
whom such Service or Labor may be due." Id.
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. The Nineteenth Amendment provides that "[tihe right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex." Id.
15 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[N]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Id.
16 See Amii Larkin Barnard, The Application of Critical Race Feminism to the Anti-
Lynching Movement: Black Women's Fight Against Race and Gender Ideology, 1892-1920, 3
UCLA WoMEN's L.J. 1, 6 (1993) (noting that over 3000 African-Americans were murdered
by lynching from 1882 to 1923).
17 See generally F. Michael Higginbotham, Sins From the Past and Lessons For the Fu-
ture: Eliminating Apartheid in South African Public Accommodations and the Challenge to
an Enlightened Judiciary, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 2, 2 (1994) (noting inferior eating and waiting
facilities, and absence of hot meals for blacks).
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Civil Rights leaders waged a public relations campaign
designed to force white Americans to look at African Americans as
individual human beings with hopes and dreams and a range of
abilities not unlike their own.
On August 28, 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King voiced his hope
that Black Americans would one day be judged, not "by the color of
their skin, but by the content of their character.""' Dr. King's elo-
quent vision of America's future captured the hearts of the Ameri-
can people and the essence of a concept of equality that has domi-
nated legal, political, academic, moral and popular thought for
nearly 30 years-equality means judging people on the basis of
their individual merits, not on the basis of stereotypical assump-
tions associated with their membership in a group.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 19 the first comprehensive stat-
ute prohibiting discrimination in employment, was a product of
the Civil Rights Movement. Enacted in 1965, Title VII prohibits
employers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual ... be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin."2° By its terms, Title VII was primarily concerned with elimi-
nating employment decisions made on the basis of group
membership, thus encouraging decisions based on merit. Today,
color blind, merit-based employment decisions are supported by a
substantial majority of our population.21
A more recent Los Angeles Times poll reveals that Americans
continue to strongly support color and gender-blind, merit-based
hiring.22 Although those polled expressed general support for af-
firmative action by a margin of fifty-two percent to twenty-nine
percent,2 3 when asked whether qualified minorities and women
18 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech Delivered at the Lincoln Memo-
rial, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1963) (transcript available at the John Henry & Mary
Louise Dunn Bryant Foundation: Los Angeles).
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1981) (amended 1988).
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) § 703(a).
21 Barry Bearak & David Lamb, Revolution Incomplete, L.A. TndEs, Mar. 8, 1987, at 1. In
1987, the LA Times reported the results of 40 years of surveys by national pollsters on
racial attitudes. Id. The results show a dramatic shift from bigotry to tolerance. Id. "In
1944, only 44% of whites said blacks deserved an equal chance at any kind of job, but by
1972, the total had climbed to 97 percent." Id.
22 See Cathleen Decker, The Times Poll; Most Back Anti-Bias Policy But Spurn Racial
Preferences, L.A. TMEas, Mar. 30, 1995, at Al (discussing recent poll of Americans' views on
race and gender employment discrimination and affirmative action).
23 See id. The author states that during the month the article was written "the percent-
age in favor of affirmative action slipped 3 points, while the percentage opposing it climbed
by 10, for a 52%-29% margin." Id.
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should receive preferences over equally qualified white male can-
didates, more than seventy percent of those responding said no.24
Although the L.A. Times did not ask whether respondents favored
preferences for equally qualified males and whites, it is highly
likely that the ninety-seven percent opposed figure discovered in
1972 continues to hold.
What explains the overwhelming support for merit based hiring
and opposition to decisions based on race, sex and other protected
characteristics? The most obvious and fundamental answer is
that making decisions based on membership in a group, rather
than on individual qualifications, is perceived as fundamentally
unfair. Discrimination is unfair because group membership does
not accurately predict individual merit, and the individual has no
control over membership in the group (immutable characteristics),
or has exercised a fundamental right in choosing to become a
member of the group (such as religion).
But, what is wrong about basing decisions on group member-
ship? Even if the decision is incorrect and inefficient, why is it
judged wrongful, morally repugnant, and unfair? First and fore-
most, race-based decisions are an attack on dignity. Given the
history of slavery and racial discrimination in this country, re-
jecting an applicant because he is black carries with it a presump-
tion of hostility, hate and negative stereotyping. The decision is
an assault on dignity, because it is presumed by its victim to be
motivated by a desire to keep talented blacks subservient or to be
based on the assumption that blacks are inferior in some way. It
is insulting because a rejection based solely on race denies the re-
jected person his or her individuality. It is dehumanizing.25
24 See id. Results of the survey showed that "72% opposed racial preferences, compared
to 22% who supported them. Similarly, 70% opposed gender preferences, while 25% sup-
ported them." Id.
25 Consider the words of Professor Patricia J. Williams describing her response to being
excluded from a New York City shop on the basis of her race:
I was enraged. At that moment I literally wanted to break all the windows of the store
and take lots of sweaters for my mother. In the fficker of his judgmental gray eyes, that
sales child had transformed my brightly sentimental, joy-to-the-world, pre-Christmas
spree to a shambles. He snuffed my sense of humanitarian catholicity, and there was
nothing I could do to snuff his, without making a spectacle of myself.
I am still struck by the structure of power that drove me into such a blizzard of rage.
There was almost nothing I could do, short of physically intruding upon him, that
would humiliate him the way he humiliated me. No words, no gestures, no prejudices
of my own would make a bit of difference to him; his refusal to let me into the store...
was an outward manifestation of his never having let someone like me into the realm
of his reality. He had no compassion, no remorse, no reference to me; and no desire to
1995]
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An employment decision rejecting a white applicant pursuant to
an affirmative action plan does not carry with it quite the same
insult. The white applicant is rejected, not because he or she is
hated or presumed to be inferior, but rather to serve the broader
social interest in remedying past discrimination and diversifying
the work place.26
To be sure, there are instances in which race or gender-based
decisions are stigmatizing as when an enterprise dominated by Af-
rican Americans declines to hire whites because they are disliked,
or a battered women's shelter rejects a male applicant on the ster-
eotypical assumption that men, as a group, are insensitive. Pref-
erential hiring that stigmatizes whites or men, however, is the ex-
ception rather than the rule.
Why then is a race or gender-based preference so controversial
and objectionable even when its purpose is to diversify a previ-
ously segregated workplace? Race and gender-based hiring that
gives preference to less qualified minorities and women obviously
raises efficiency concerns. The intensity of feeling over reverse
discrimination stems from a sense that decisions unrelated to
merit are unfair because the more qualified applicant deserves the
job.
Part of the American ethos is a rejection of class-based privilege.
Immigrants flock to America because it is perceived as a land of
opportunity where it is possible to work hard and get ahead. It is
an ideal shared by Americans themselves, a defining characteris-
tic of what it means to be American. Individuals are rewarded on
the basis of merit rather than on the basis of class or birthright.
Therefore, it seems fundamentally unfair to deny rewards to a
more qualified individual. Race and gender-based decisions re-
jecting qualified applicants fail to reward merit and are therefore
perceived as unfair whether the decision favors or disfavors wo-
men and minority group members.
Laws prohibiting race and gender discrimination enjoy broad
support because discrimination is viewed as morally wrong and
acknowledge me even at the estranged level of arm's-length transactor. He saw me
only as one who would take his money and therefore could not conceive that I was
there to give him money.
26 See Michel Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action, Justice, and Equalities: A Philosophical and
Constitutional Appraisal, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 919 (1985) (discussing government-spon-
sored affirmative action programs as necessary to compensate and reintegrate blacks).
[Vol. 10:481
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unfair on the grounds that it is insulting and fails to reward indi-
vidual merit. Laws prohibiting discrimination also are consistent
with public policy in that they promote efficiency by encouraging
employers to rely on job-related employment criteria and by en-
heartening minorities and women to acquire job skills.
While Dr. King's vision of merit based equality enjoys broad
support, any vision of equality defined in one dimension, creates
inequalities in other dimensions. 27 Dr. King's vision defines equal-
ity as equal treatment of similarly qualified individuals. This con-
cept of equality justifies denying employment opportunities to in-
dividuals who are not as bright, physically able or skilled.28 It
defines unequal treatment based on physical and mental abilities,
education and skills, as equal and therefore justifiable.29
Despite the overwhelming political consensus and economic effi-
ciencies supporting merit-based equality, philosophers have long
questioned the moral basis of inequality based on "merit." 0 Why
should an individual who is fortunate enough to have been born
physically fit and cognitively gifted "deserve" the rewards of a
good job? His innate intelligence and physical health are not the
result of hard work. He was just lucky. Even if we assume that
he has worked to make the best of his innate abilities, does he
"deserve" a good life if his ability to capitalize on his talents was
enhanced by his good fortune at being born into a stable middle
class family and community that helped him to develop? The
American system of merit-based equality causes and justifies sub-
stantial disparities in employment opportunities based on physi-
cal and mental abilities and education.
In the context of race and gender discrimination, Congress and
the various courts have struggled with the problem of providing
"equal" employment opportunities to individuals who approach
the competition for good jobs with different abilities and skills.
First, when pregnant women sought protection from discrimina-
27 See generally SEN. AMARTYA, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992).
28 See Rosenfeld, supra note 26, at 919. The author stated that:
If each person is to be treated equally according to his or her merit, equality will re-
quire that those whose merits are alike be treated alike, but that those whose merits
are different be treated differently ... a failure to treat those with different merit
unequally would undermine the implementation of the principle: To each according to
his or her merit.
Id.
29 See generally Rosenfeld, supra note 26, at 849-50.
30 See, e.g., JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-17 (1971).
1995]
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tion, Congress responded with an amendment that addressed the
job-related limitations associated with pregnancy by guaranteeing
pregnant women the same treatment as other similarly disabled
workers. 3 1
Second, minorities and women have challenged the employer's
use of employment criteria that disproportionately exclude minor-
ities and women. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,32 black employees
challenged, as unfair, a high school diploma as a prerequisite for
employment opportunities, especially in a social context in which
blacks were deprived of one by state mandated discrimination in
education.33
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,34 minimum height and weight re-
quirements for selecting prison guards eliminated most women. 5
The Court's response to the challenges presented in Dothard was
to create a new theory of discrimination, disparate impact.36 This
theory preserves merit-based equality by prohibiting the use of
employment criteria that disproportionately excludes minorities
and women, but only if those criteria are not job related and a
business necessity. 37 Inequality resulting from job related criteria
is permitted.
Finally, the Court has considered the legality of voluntary af-
firmative action plans adopted by employers trying to equalize
31 See The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 9-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
amending Title VII to include Section 701(k), which provides that:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected by similar in their ability or
inability to work.
Id.
32 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
33 Id, at 430.
34 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
35 See id. at 329-30.
36 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645 (1989). Pursuant to the
disparate-impact theory, "a facially neutral employment practice may be deemed violative
of Title VII without evidence of the employer's subjective intent to discriminate, which is
required in a 'disparate-treatment' case." Id.; see also Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact
Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 45 RUTGERs L. REV. 1011, 1013-19 (1993)(discussing burdens placed on both parties in disparate impact discrimination action).
37 See Alito, supra note 36, at 1016-17. The author discussed that:
Disparate impact discrimination is proved if: (1) plaintiff 'demonstrates' that defend-
ant uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact, and (2) de-
fendant fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity.
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employment opportunities for less qualified groups.38 The Court's
tentative departure from a strict equality principle, permitting
but not requiring voluntary affirmative action and hiring prefer-
ences in limited circumstances, is currently the subject of intense
national political debate.39
In some respects, the Americans with Disabilities Act (the
"ADA") is no different than other anti-discrimination statutes. It
prohibits individual and systemic disparate treatment 40 of quali-
fied individuals with disabilities, and it prohibits the use of non-
job related employment criteria that have a disparate impact on
individuals with disabilities.4 1
Discrimination against individuals with disabilities is morally
reprehensible for the same reasons as discrimination on the basis
of race or gender. It is unfair and an assault on dignity when a
qualified individual with a disability is denied employment on the
basis of unsubstantiated stereotypical assumptions of inferiority42
or because the employer perceives the disability as offensive. Like
decisions based on race or gender, decisions based on disabilities
are unfair, in part, because having a disability is a factor over
which the individual has no control.
The ADA, however, does more than require employers to treat
individuals with disabilities in the same way as other similarly
qualified applicants or workers. The ADA imposes on employers
38 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 193 (1979); Johnson v. Trans-
portation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 616 (1987).
39 See generally, Daniel Seligman, The Scrutinizers (US Supreme Court Fails to End
Affirmative Action), 132 FoRxnrE 170, 170 (1995) (arguing that Adarand's failure to create
bright-line rule necessitates Congressional action to end affirmative action); Stephen
Wermiel, Supreme Court, in 6.3 Vote, Backs Hiring Goals to Correct Sex Bias, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 26, 1987 (detailing reactions to Supreme Court's decision that public employers, as
well as private employers, may implement voluntary affirmative action plans).
40 See Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories,
and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 430 (1995). The author notes that with disparate treat-
ment "the employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1993). The ADA provides that:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
Id.
42 See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolu-
tion of Federal Legislation and Social Policy For People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. Rxv.
1341, 1343 (1993). The author discusses how li]n a culture that values the 'protestant
work ethic' as well as a strong mind and body, people with disabilities are commonly
viewed as deficient and inferior" and "people with disabilities have often been treated as
inherently inferior, and removed from mainstream society." Id.
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an obligation to provide reasonable accommodations 4 to make it
possible for disabled individuals to perform essential job functions
and to secure equal enjoyment of all terms and conditions of
employment."
The concept of reasonable accommodation is not entirely new.
Title VII requires employers to accommodate the religious needs
of employees. 45 The concept of accommodating religion, however,
has been severely restricted by the courts to avoid conflicting
with the First Amendment 46 prohibition against establishing reli-
gion.47 Reasonable accommodation also is required in the Rehabil-
itation Act. The ADA's reasonable accommodation provision, how-
ever, has a much greater impact because the ADA applies to
nearly all employers.48
What policy justifications support requiring employers to ac-
commodate individuals with disabilities? Most individuals with
disabilities are not responsible for their condition or are not capa-
ble of changing their condition. Reasonable accommodations pro-
vided by an employer may make the difference between living in
poverty on public assistance, and living a productive self-sufficient
lifestyle with a higher standard of living.
The obligation to accommodate, therefore, provides individuals
with disabilities enhanced employment opportunities, 49 the dig-
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. V 1993). The ADA defines reasonable accommodation
as "making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individ-
uals with disabilities." Id.
44 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (Supp. V 1993). Discrimination against people with disabili-
ties under the ADA "includes not making reasonable accommodations to the known physi-
cal or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee." Id. Section 102(a) of the ADA prohibits discrimination against a
"qualified individual with a disability." Id.
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988). The statute defines the term religion to include "all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief." Id. Section 701(j) of Title VII
requires employers to "reasonably accommodate an employee's... religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id.
46 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id.
47 See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 60 (1986); Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 63 (1977).
48 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1988). The ADA defines employer as "a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent
of said person." Id.
49 See Peter D. Blanck, Employment Integration, Economic Opportunity, and The Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act: Empirical Study from 1990-1993, 79 IOWA L. REv. 853, 868(1994) (using empirical data to gauge effectiveness of mandated accommodation measures
on employment integration and economic opportunity).
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nity associated with self support, and improved quality of life. 50
Certainly, qualified individuals with disabilities51 are as deserv-
ing of employment opportunities as equally qualified individuals
who have the good fortune not to be disabled.
Mandating reasonable accommodations may reduce the cost of
supporting disabled individuals and transfers the cost from the
public to the private sector.5 2 In Section Two of the ADA, Congress
identified findings and purposes for the ADA consistent with these
policy justifications.5 3 Mandating reasonable accommodations for
individuals with disabilities is a step in the direction of providing
equality in a different dimension than that envisioned in Dr.
King's speech and generally embraced by law and public opinion.
Rather than provide equal treatment for individuals with similar
capabilities, the ADA promotes equal employment opportunities
for individuals with differing capabilities.
Equality in one dimension means inequality in another dimen-
sion. Equal employment opportunity is achieved under the ADA
by mandating different treatment for individuals with disabilities;
different treatment in the form of reasonable accommodations.
Let me illustrate. Suppose an individual who suffers from Multi-
ple Sclerosis seeks a job in an office building. She has difficulty
walking and requests the office closest to the elevators. Although
she might be entitled to this office as a reasonable accommodation,
another employee forced to use crutches because of a broken leg
would not be entitled to the same accommodation. The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission's interpretation of the ADA in-
dicates that individuals who suffer from temporary disabilities are
not covered by the ADA.54
Consider also, a dyslexic applicant for a civil service job who re-
quests extra time to take the examination required for the job.
Although this applicant may be entitled to an accommodation, an-
50 See JANE WEST, THE EVOLUTION OF DISABILrrY RIGHTS, IN IMPLEMENTING THE AMERI-
cANs WITH DIsABILrrIs ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERIcANs 3 (Lawrence
0. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds. 1993) (stating that ADA seeks to establish full participa-
tion and independent living as national goals for persons with disabilities).
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. V 1993). A qualified individual with a disability is
defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires." Id.
52 See Blanck, supra note 49, at 854.
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. V 1993).
54 See EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 § 1630.2 (1991).
1995]
492 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
other applicant with a below average I.Q., not sufficiently low to
constitute a disability, would not be entitled to the same accom-
modation.5 5 Consider also, an individual with a permanent back
injury who is relieved of heavy lifting responsibilities as an accom-
modation. Another employee with the same degree of disability
who suffers from a temporary back injury would not be entitled to
the same accommodation.
Finally, consider an individual with achondroplastic dwarfism
who seeks a job stocking shelves in a supermarket. While he
might be entitled to an accommodation in the form of a rolling
step ladder, another applicant who is merely short, but not suffi-
ciently short to qualify as disabled, would have no legal recourse if
the employer declined to provide the necessary equipment to per-
mit her to do the job.
The reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA seem to
run completely contrary to our understanding of equal treatment
developed under other anti-discrimination statutes. Individuals
are judged, not on the basis of their individual merits or needs,
but rather on the basis of their membership in a group-individu-
als with a disability. Insofar as requiring reasonable accommoda-
tions promotes self-sufficiency and a sense of dignity for individu-
als with disabilities, cannot the same be said for the individual
with below average intelligence who, as a result, has difficulty
finding work? All of the policy reasons which support mandating
reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities seem
equally applicable to individuals with impairments or limitations
beyond their control that are not sufficiently severe or chronic to
qualify as disabilities within the meaning of the ADA.
If reasonable accommodations are mandated to provide access
to employment opportunities, should that access be equally avail-
able to similarly situated individuals, or does this argument prove
too much? Consider the impact on efficiency of guaranteeing rea-
sonable accommodations and equal employment opportunities to
all applicants. Even if reasonable accommodations enable individ-
uals to perform the essential functions of a job they could not
otherwise perform, will they be as effective as an applicant who
does not require accommodation? Consider also, the costs of the
accommodation and the costs of enforcing compliance. Are these
55 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, § 1630.2.
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costs outweighed by the savings in public assistance outlays, or by
the improved standard of living for accommodated individuals, or
by the intangible values associated with self-sufficiency and
fairness?
By my remarks and questions, I do not mean to suggest that the
ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement is necessarily bad
policy. I mean only to point out that it represents a different vi-
sion of equality than that under traditional anti-discrimination
statutes. This new vision of equality obviously raises questions
about economic efficiency, but beyond the questions of cost lie
larger issues of justice and fairness.
Recognition of the right of black Americans to equal treatment
changed the nation's and even the world's views on equality. The
American Civil Rights Movement inspired freedom movements in
South Africa and rekindled the Irish bid for political rights. In the
United States, other groups sought the same protection against
discrimination first accorded to black Americans. Discrimination
is now prohibited by national, state and local legislation and regu-
lations on the basis of numerous characteristics. 56
Similarly, we can expect that the widespread implementation of
the concept of reasonable accommodation will raise expectations
among workers concerning employers' obligations to accommodate
differences. For example, a pregnant woman with back problems
or other physical limitations associated with her pregnancy will
wonder why she is not entitled to light duty when an individual
with similar limitations related to a disability covered by the ADA
is entitled to that accommodation; although she may have a rem-
edy under the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment of Title VII.
As disabled individuals are regularly accommodated in the work-
place, it is likely that individuals who have low IQ's or who are
substantially overweight or small in stature will also begin to ex-
pect and demand the same accommodations that disabled individ-
uals receive as a matter of course. Their demands may lead to
lawsuits under the ADA and expansive interpretation of the ADA
coverage. Alternatively, their demands may take the form of
56 See, e.g., D.C. CODE AN. § 1-2501 (1994). The District of Columbia prohibits discrimi-
nation for any reason other than merit, including, but not limited to discrimination by
reason of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appear-
ance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, physical
handicap, source of income, and place of residence of business. Id.
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political action seeking new legislation expanding the concept and
applicability of reasonable accommodation.
Expansive reading of the ADA definition of disability combined
with demands for equal employment opportunity through work-
place accommodation for individuals currently outside of ADA cov-
erage may create a backlash against the rights granted under the
ADA similar to the backlash against affirmative action. Demands
for extended application of the concepts of reasonable accommoda-
tion and equal employment opportunity will challenge this society
either to articulate policy reasons for distinguishing disabled indi-
viduals from others who require accommodation or to extend these
rights to other similarly limited individuals. In short, the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirement and focus on equal em-
ployment opportunity raises significant questions about where, as
a society, we want to go from here.
This new vision of equality can be predicted to change the ex-
pectations of individuals in the work force, so that they expect ac-
commodations for disabilities, whether they are covered by the
ADA or not. If those expectations are not met, perhaps we can
foresee the possibility of a backlash against the special treatment
that the ADA accords to disabled individuals. The ADA chal-
lenges us as well. It creates a new vision of equality which we
need to consider in terms of its implications for other similarly
situated individuals.
[Vol. 10:481
